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("Haste, Inc.") and Harry Gounaris ("Gounaris"), (collectively "Appellants"), by and through
their counsel John Martinez, hereby submit the following Opening Brief:
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2002)
over this case, which was transferred from the Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. §78-22(4)(2002). The Supreme Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)G)(2002)(appeal from final judgment).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that res judicata barred defendantappellant Harry Gounaris from asserting defenses on behalf of defendant-appellant Haste,
Inc.? (Ruling, dated October 28, 2004) (R. 932-925)(Addendum Exh. 1).
Standard of Review: lfA trial court's determination of whether res judicata bars an
action 'presents a question of law. We review such questions for correctness, according no
particular deference to the trial court.' " Macris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT App
230, | 5, 986 P.2d 748 (citation omitted); see also Grynberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co.. 2003
UT 8, ^23, 70 P.3d 1 (application of the doctrine of res judicata is a matter of law reviewed
for correctness).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules of central importance to this
appeal
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition in court below
This is a case in which the trial court threw out the baby with the bath water.
Appellant Harry Gounaris owned 50% of certain Notes, and was assigned the other
50% by Steven Kallinikos, who subsequently went bankrupt. The Bankruptcy Court
thereafter voided the assignment of the second 50% as a preferential transfer. The trial court
below, however, thereafter held that Appellant Gounaris owned no part of the Notes at all!
The court thereby threw out Appellant's original 50% ownership (the baby) with the voided
50% assignment (the bath water).
Ownership of the Notes is critical, because one of the notes is the only remaining asset
of Haste, Inc., the company at issue in this litigation. Appellant Gounaris contends that he
retained his 50% ownership of the Notes, and hence a beneficial interest in Haste, Inc. Thus,
he has standing to assert claims and defenses on behalf of Haste, Inc. The trial court
erroneously determined that the Bankruptcy Court's judgment voiding the assignment of the
second 50% of the subject Notes as a preferential transfer had the effect, through the doctrine
of res judicata, of voiding aU of Appellant Gounaris' interest in the Notes-and by extension,
all of Appellant Gounaris' interest in Haste, Inc. On that basis, the court held that Appellant
Gounaris lacked standing to assert claims or defenses on behalf of Haste, Inc. The trial court
therefore granted Appellee Zufelt's motion to strike Haste, Inc.'s pleadings and for the entry
of judgment, premised on Appellant Gounaris' lack of standing to assert claims or defenses
on behalf of Haste, Inc. This appeal ensued.
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Statement of Facts
1.

On July 6, 1990, Steven Kallinikos and Harry Gounaris incorporated Haste,

Inc. for the purpose of doing business as the "Burger Supreme" restaurant located at 1796
North University Parkway, Provo, Utah. Affidavit of Steven Kallinikos ("Kallinikos Aff")
% 2 (R. 355-56) (Addendum Exh. 2); Affidavit of Harry Gounaris ("Gounaris Aff") ^ 2 (R.
347-48)(Addendum Exh. 3).
2.

Kallinikos operated Burger Supreme, while Gounaris supplied the capital

investment necessary to fund the operations of the restaurant. Kallinikos Aff. f 4 (R. 355)
(Addendum Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff f 3 (R. 347)(Addendum Exh. 3).
3.

On or about November 1997, Haste, Inc. sold its assets, including Burger

Supreme, to Richard Nuttall in exchange for two notes dated November 1, 1997. The first
note, for $15,000, was made payable to Gounaris and Kallinikos personally ("Nuttall
Personal Note"). Gounaris and Kallinikos each had a 50% interest in the Nuttall Personal
Note. The second note, for $72,000, was made to Haste, Inc. ("Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note").
Gounaris and Kallinikos likewise each had a 50% interest in the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note.
Kallinikos Aff ^ 6 (R. 355)(Addendum Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff. ^ 5 (R. 347)(Addendum
Exh. 3); Bankr. Ct. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^ 8 at 2 (R. 468)(Addendum
Exh. 4).
5.

Only the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note is at issue in this litigation. Zufelt Mem.

1/17/02 at 10 (R. 300) ("The ... small (Personal) Note ... is not part of this lawsuit.").
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6.

Haste, Inc. no longer conducted any business after the sale of its assets to

Nuttall. Zufelt Mem. 1/17/02 at 9 (R. 301) ("Haste, Inc. no longer conducted any business
after the sale of its business to Nuttall."); Kallinikos Aff. ^ 7 (R. 355)(Addendum Exh. 2);
Gounaris Aff. If 6 (R. 347)(Addendum Exh. 3).
7.

After the sale of the Haste, Inc. assets to Richard Nuttall, Haste, Inc.'s only

asset was the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note, and its only corporate purpose was to act as recipient
of the amounts due thereunder and to distribute the money to Gounaris and Kallinikos. See
Kallinikos Aff 18 (R. 354-55)(Addendum Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff. If 7 (R. 347)(Addendum
Exh. 3).
8.

Haste, Inc. continued to receive the payments under the Nuttall Haste, Inc.

Note, which were distributed for a time half to Gounaris and half to Kallinikos. However,
sometime in 1999, Kallinikos experienced financial difficulty and stopped remitting to
Gounaris his portion of the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note proceeds. Kallinikos Aff. f 9 (R.
354)(Addendum Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff. % 8 (R. 346)(Addendum Exh. 3); Bankr. Ct. Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^ 9 at 3 (R. 468)(Addendum Exh. 4).
9.

In March 1998, unbeknownst to Gounaris, Kallinikos executed a Lease

Agreement with Appellee Zufelt. Kallinikos Aff f 10 (R. 3 54)(Addendum Exh. 2); Gounaris
Aff. 19 (R. 346)(Addendum Exh. 3).
10.

Although the Lease Agreement between Kallinikos and Zufelt indicates that

Haste, Inc. entered into the lease, Kallinikos entered the lease personally, without informing
Gounaris, and without authority from Haste, Inc. Kallinikos Aff. % 11 (R. 354)(Addendum
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Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff. f 10 (R. 346)(Addendum Exh. 3).
11.

The Lease Agreement was personally guaranteed by Kallinikos. Zufelt Mem.

1/17/02 Ex. A at 1 (R. 294).
12.

Kallinikos intended to start a new restaurant business on the leased premises.

Kallinikos Aff. f 10 (R. 354)(Addendum Exh. 2).
13.

The new business venture started by Kallinikos on the leased premises

provided no benefit to Gounaris or to Haste, Inc. Kallinikos Aff. ^J 10 (R. 354)(Addendum
Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff. ^ 9 (R. 346)(Addendum Exh. 3).
14.

In April, 1999, Kallinikos abandoned the leased premises. Kallinikos Aff. f 12

(R. 3 54)(Addendum Exh. 2).
15.

In May and June 1999, Gounaris took out an equity line-of-credit loan on his

home and used the money to lend Kallinikos an additional $20,000. Kallinikos Aff. ^f 13 (R.
353)(Addendum Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff. 1f 11 (R. 346)(Addendum Exh. 3); Zufelt Mem.
1/17/02 at Exh. C (cancelled checks on Gounaris' home equity line of credit) (R. 255-56).
16.

In addition to the $20,000 loan, Kallinikos owed Gounaris back payments for

the proceeds from the Nuttal Haste Inc. Note and the Nuttal Personal Note that Kallinikos
had neglected to forward to Gounaris. Kallinikos Aff. U 9 (R. 354)(Addendum Exh. 2);
Gounaris Aff. U 11 (R. 346)(Addendum Exh. 3).
17.

Zufelt knew that Kallinikos alone stood behind the Lease Agreement because

Kallinikos explained exactly that to Zufelt. Kallinikos Aff. f 14 (R. 353)(Addendum Exh.
2).
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18.

Kallinikos never told Zufelt that Haste, Inc. assets were available to satisfy

Kallinikos' obligations pursuant to the Lease Agreement. Kallinikos Aff. ^| 14 (R.
353)(Addendum Exh. 2).
19.

As a result, in October 1999, Zufelt negotiated a compromise with Kallinikos

personally (not with Haste, Inc.) for the amounts due and owing under the Lease Agreement
as of April 1999, when Kallinikos abandoned the premises. Kallinikos Aff. ^ 14 (R.
353)(AddendumExh.2).
20.

Zufelt did not look to Haste, Inc. to satisfy the amounts due and owing pursuant

to the Lease Agreement Kallinikos entered into with Zufelt. Kallinikos Aff. ^ 14 (R.
353)(AddendumExh.2).
21.

In order to compromise the amount owed to Zufelt by Kallinikos, on October

19, 1999, Kallinikos executed a personal Promissory Note [hereinafter "Kallinikos
Compromise Promissory Note"] in favor of Zufelt. Kallinikos Aff. f 15 (R. 353)(Addendum
Exh. 2).
22.

The Kallinikos Compromise Promissory Note obligates only Kallinikos, not

Haste, Inc. See Zufelt Mem. 1/17/02 Ex. B at 1 (identifying only Kallinikos as the maker of
the Kallinikos Compromise Promissory Note) (R. 280).
23.

By the Kallinikos Compromise Promissory Note, Zufelt and Kallinikos

intended to resolve all obligations pursuant to the Lease Agreement. Kallinikos Aff. ^f 15 (R.
353)(Addendum Exh. 2).
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24.

On or about February 2000, Gounaris demanded that Kallinikos repay the

$20,000 Gounaris had loaned to him in 1999, as well as to account for money received by
Kallinikos on the Nuttall Personal Note and the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note that should have
gone to Gounaris but was instead converted by Kallinikos. Kallinikos Aff. <| 16 (R. 35253)(Addendum Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff. ^ 13 (R. 345)(Addendum Exh. 3).
25.

Kallinikos was unable to repay Gounaris except through an assignment of

Kallinikos' remaining 50% interest in the Nuttall Personal Note and in the Nuttall Haste, Inc.
Note. Thus, on February 25, 2000, Kallinikos assigned his remaining 50% interest in both
the Nuttall Personal Note and the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note to Gounaris. See Kallinikos Aff.
Tf 17 (R. 352)(Addendum Exh. 2); Gounaris Aff. ^ 14 (R. 345)(Addendum Exh. 3); Bankr.
Ct Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^16 at 4 (R. 466)(Addendum Exh. 4).
26.

On February 13, 2001, Kallinikos filed for bankruptcy protection. (R. 468).

27.

On June 18, 2001, Stephen W. Rupp, the Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of

Kallinikos ("Trustee") filed an adversary proceeding in the Kallinikos bankruptcy alleging
that the assignment by Kallinikos of his interest in the Nuttall Personal Note and the Nuttall
Haste, Inc. Note to Gounaris constituted preferential transfers and should be avoided. See
Bankr. Ct. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 469)(Addendum Exh. 4).
Significantly, the Trustee did not allege Kallinikos owned and had assigned 100% of Haste,
Inc. to Gounaris, but only that Kallinikos "assigned a 50% interest in two promissory notes
to Harry Gounaris... and that the assignment was avoidable as a preferential transfer...." (R.
469).
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28.

On July 25,2002, the Bankruptcy Court made findings of fact and conclusions

of law and entered an order avoiding the transfer of Kallinikos' 50% interest in the Nuttall
Personal Note and in the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note to Gounaris as preferential transfers
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547. See Bankr. Ct. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
469)(Addendum Exh. 4).
29.

Significantly, however, the Bankruptcy Court specifically ordered that only

Kallinikos' interest in the Nuttall Personal Note and the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note were
recaptured back into Kallinikos' bankruptcy estate. See id. at 4 (R. 466)("Finding 17.
[Kallinikos] transferred his interest in the Notes to [Gounaris]... .")(emphasis added); id at
5 (R. 465)("...the principle(sic) balance due on the Haste, Inc. note was $54,749.52, and on
the [Nuttall Personal] note was $11, 724.54. Half of the balances of the two notes ... was
$33,207.03 (sic: $33,237.03)"); Bankr. Ct. Judgment (R. 452)(Addendum Exh. 5)("the
Debtor's interest"); see also Trustee's Notice of Bankruptcy Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment at 2 (R. 470)("By this Notice, the bankruptcy Trustee
hereby gives notice to this Court and the parties in this litigation of the bankruptcy estate's
one-half interest and ownership of the two notes...")(emphasis added).
30.

On July 16, 2002, the Trustee moved to intervene in the District Court below.

At the same time, the Trustee moved the District Court to strike the pleadings filed by Haste,
Inc. and for entry of default judgment against Haste, Inc. See Trustee's Motion to Intervene,
Motion to Strike, Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (R. 415).
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31.

On April 4, 2003, the District Court granted only the Trustee's Motion to

Intervene. See Minute Entry, April 4, 2003 (R. 544); Order, August 8, 2003 (R. 698).
32.

On May 16, 2003, the Trustee renewed his motion to strike Haste, Inc.'s

pleadings and to enter default against Haste, Inc., arguing that Appellant Gounaris lacked
standing to assert defenses on behalf of Haste, Inc. .See Trustee's Motion to Intervene, Motion
to Strike, Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (R. 562). The Court denied the Trustee's
motion to strike Haste, Inc.'s pleadings and also denied entry of default judgment against
Haste, Inc. See Minutes of Hearing, August 8,2003 (R. 692)("Mr. Rupp addresses the Court
regarding the motion to strike...The Court finds there are issues of fact remaining and denies
this motion."); see also Order, August 8, 2003 (R. 698)(only intervention granted).
33.

On June 1, 2004, and for the third go-around, Zufelt filed an identical motion

to strike Haste, Inc.'s pleadings and for the entry ofjudgment based on a lack of standing by
Gounaris to assert defenses on behalf of Haste, Inc. See Zufelt's Motion to Strike or Dismiss
or for Entry of Judgment (R. 824 (motion); R. 851 (supporting memorandum)).
34.

On October 28,2004, the Court granted Zufelt's motion. The Court's ruling was

predicated on the application of res judicata regarding the issue of who owned Haste, Inc.
The Court concluded that Appellant Gounaris had litigated the ownership issue in the
adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court and that the Bankruptcy Court had concluded that
Kallinikos was 100% owner of Haste, Inc.—thereby nullifying the original 50% interest in
the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note that unquestionably belonged to Gounaris all along. Based on
that conclusion, the Court ruled that Gounaris lacked standing to assert defenses on behalf
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of Haste, Inc., struck Haste, Inc.'s pleadings and granted the previously denied Motion for
Summary Judgment against Appellants Gounaris and Haste, Inc. (R. 932--925)("Ruling").
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court erroneously concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred
Gounaris from asserting defenses on behalf of his co-defendant Haste, Inc. Kallinikos filed
for bankruptcy on February 13, 2001. The Trustee in bankruptcy filed an adversary
proceeding against Gounaris asserting that the assignments of the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note
and the Nuttall Personal Note to Gounaris were preferential transfers and should be set aside.
The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Trustee and on July 25, 2002 issued an order and
judgment holding the assignments of the notes were avoidable under Bankruptcy Code
Section 547 as preferential transfers.
Misinterpreting the Bankruptcy Court's order, the District Court below concluded that
res judicata barred Gounaris from claiming an ownership interest in Haste, Inc. And since
Gounaris thus was held to lack an ownership interest in Haste, Inc., the Court ruled further
that he lacked standing to assert defenses on Haste, Inc.'s behalf. The District Court's
conclusions were clearly erroneous. First, the issue of Haste, Inc. ownership was not
addressed by the Bankruptcy Court. The issue thus was not "completely, fully and fairly
litigated" in the bankruptcy court as required for the application of res judicata.
Consequently, res judicata has no application.
Second, and quite contrary to the District Court's basis for finding res judicata applied,
to the extent the bankruptcy court even tangentially touched on the issue of ownership of
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Haste, Inc., the bankruptcy court found that Gounaris was indeed an owner. Most
significantly, the Bankruptcy Court's ultimate ruling in the adversary proceeding supports the
conclusion that Gounaris owns one-half of Haste, Inc. As an owner of Haste, Inc., Gounaris
has standing to assert defenses on behalf of Haste Inc., and the District Court's judgment
finding otherwise should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF GOUNARIS1 OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN
HASTE, INC. WAS NOT "IDENTICAL" TO ANY ISSUE RAISED IN THE
BANKRUPTCY COURT, AND BECAUSE SUCH ISSUE WAS NOT
"COMPLETELY, FULLY AND FAIRLY LITIGATED" IN THE BANKRUPTCY
COURT
The District Court improperly applied the doctrine of res judicata to conclude that
Gounaris lacked an ownership interest in Haste, Inc. First, that issue was not "identical11 to
any issue determined by the bankruptcy court. Second, even if that issue had hem presented
to the bankruptcy court, it was not "completely, fully and fairly litigated" in that court. For
each of these two independent reasons, res judicata does not apply.
"The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of preventing previously
litigated issues from being re-litigated." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6, ^ 57, 44
P.3d 63. The doctrine describes the binding effect of a previous adjudication on a current
adjudication. See Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah
1995); 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4402 (1981). The
general term "res judicata" is an umbrella concept that refers to two distinct branches of the
doctrine: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc.,
11

2000 UT 93, K 19, 16 P.3d 1214 (citing Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 766 P.2d
1059,1061 (Utah 1988)). Claim preclusion applies where both cases involve the same parties
or their privies. Macris. 2000 UT 93, % 20. Issue preclusion applies where the issue litigated
is identical in both actions, although the parties are not. Id. ^ 19. Because Appellee Zufelt
was not a party to the adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, the District Court's
application of res judicata concerned issue preclusion.
Issue preclusion can yield unjust results if applied without reasonable consideration
and due care. Parklane Hosiery Co. Inc. v. Shore. 4339 U.S. 322,330-31 (1979). In this case
the burden of establishing that issue preclusion applies is on Zufelt. Ruling at 4 (R.
929)(AddendumExh. l¥citingPGM. Inc. v. Westchester Investment Partners. Ltd.. 2000 UT
App 20, f 5, 995 P.2d 1252); see also Mel Trimbel Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch. Inc..
758 P.2d451, 453-55 (Utah App. 1998).
The District Court held that issue preclusion precluded Appellant Gounaris from
asserting that he had an ownership interest in Haste, Inc., and that therefore, Gounaris lacked
standing to assert claims or defenses on behalf of Haste, Inc. Ruling at 4 (R. 929)(Addendum
Exh. 1). In order for issue preclusion to apply to prevent a party from re-litigating an issue
previously decided by another court, four elements must be met:
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue
in the first action must have been completely, fully and fairly litigated; and (iv) the
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Gvnberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co.. 2003 UT 8, If 23, 70 P.3d 1; Snyder v. Murray City Corp..
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2003 UT 13435, 73 P.3d325; Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993); Searle
Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). If any one of these elements is not present,
then issue preclusion is inappropriate. Hill v. Seattle First Nati Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 245
(Utah 1992). Here, the issues addressed in the Bankruptcy Court are not "identical" to the
ownership interest ruled upon by the District Court. Moreover, the issue of ownership of
Haste, Inc. was not "completely, fully and fairly litigated" in the Bankruptcy Court.
Consequently, the District Court improperly applied issue preclusion to the issue of Gounaris1
ownership in Haste, Inc.
A. The issue of Gounaris' ownership interest in Haste, Inc. was not "identical"
to any issue raised in the Bankruptcy Court
Issue preclusion requires that the factual issue decided in the prior action must be
identical to the factual issue presented in the second action. Robertson v. Campbell 674 P.2d
1226, 1230 n.l (Utah 1983). The issues must be "precisely the same." Wilde v. Mid-Century
Ins. Co.. 635 P.2d417,419 (Utah 1981); accord Schaer v. Utah Dep't of Transportation, 657
P.2d 1337,1341 (Utah 1983)(holding issues litigated in a prior proceeding must be "precisely
the same" as those raised in the present action).
The District Court found that "the Bankruptcy Court heard evidence and made
findings regarding [Gounaris1] ownership interest in Haste, Inc." Ruling at 5 (R.
928)(Addendum Exh. 1). That simply is not the case. On the contrary, the Bankruptcy Court
expressly stated:
"no documentation has been offered to indicate when or how [Gounaris] relinquished
his ownership interest in Haste, Inc."
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Bankr. Ct. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^[23 at 5(R. 465)(Addendum Exh. 4).
The issue that was decided by the Bankruptcy Court was whether the transfers to
Gounaris oiKallinikos' interest in the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note and the Nuttall Personal Note
were preferential transfers and avoidable under the bankruptcy code. See Bankr. Ct. Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 469)(Addendum Exh. 4). Specifically, the Bankruptcy
Court found: a transfer of Debtor's property occurred; Gounaris "was a creditor of the
Debtor"; the transfer occurred within one year of Debtor's Chapter 7 filing; the Debtor was
insolvent at the time; and Gounaris was an insider. Id. at 10-14 (R. 460-456). The issue of
who owned Haste, Inc., was neither a finding nor a conclusion reached by the Bankruptcy
Court. That issue simply was not addressed by the Bankruptcy Court.
This case is similar to Schaer v. Utah Dep't of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah
1983), in which the Court addressed the application of issue preclusion to a determination
that the dugway road was a public thoroughfare. The Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT) argued that issue preclusion prevented a property owner from asserting that the
dugway road was a public thoroughfare because in a prior suit, the property owner had
claimed severance damages resulting from a condemnation proceeding in which the property
owner claimed his property was effectively landlocked. Id. at 1338. UDOT asserted that the
Court's prior ruling that the property owner's land was landlocked implied a finding that the
dugway road was not a public thoroughfare, and that therefore, the doctrine of issue
preclusion prevented the property owner from re-litigating the issue. Id. at 1340. The Utah
Supreme Court rejected UDOT's argument.
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The Schaer case emphasized that the relevant inquiry is "whether the issues actually
litigated in the first action are precisely the same as those raised in the present action." Id. at
1341 (quoting Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah
1981)(emphasis added); see also American Interstate Mortgage Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT
App 16, Tf 34,41 P.3d 1142 (identical issues that were not fully litigated in prior proceeding
not subject to issue preclusion). "[T]he doctrine of [issue preclusion] 'does not apply to issues
that merely could have been tried' in the prior case, but operates only to issues which were
actually asserted and tried in that case." Id. at 1341 (quoting International Resources v.
Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515, 517 (1979)(emphasis in original). The Utah Supreme Court
concluded in Schaer that the prior proceeding did not "rule conclusively on the status of the
dugway road," and as a result, the Court held that issue preclusion was inapplicable. Id. The
same situation is present here.
The District Court itself recognized that the Bankruptcy Court had not addressed the
identical issue. In its Order, the District Court "notes that while the Bankruptcy Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law may not address the precise issue with perfect
clarity, the Court finds that reasonable conclusions can be drawn from the testimony and
evidence presented before the Bankruptcy Court..." Ruling at 5-6 (R. 928-27)(Addendum
Exh. 1). The Utah Supreme Court in Schaer held that issue preclusion requires much more.
The Court in Schaer held it improper to make inferences and piecemeal conclusions based
on a prior decision. Schaer. 657 P.2d at 1341. The identical issue must have been decided by
the Bankruptcy Court for issue preclusion to apply here. It was not. Hence, issue preclusion

15

does not apply.
B. The issue of GounarisT ownership interest in Haste, Inc. was not "fully and
fairly litigated" in the Bankruptcy Court
Even assuming ex arguendo that the issue of Gounaris' ownership interest in Haste,
Inc. was raised in the Bankruptcy Court, it certainly was not "completely, fully and fairly"
litigated there. In order for an issue to be "completely, fully and fairly litigated," as required
for the application of res judicata, it must have been "actually litigated" in the first action.
Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250, 254 n.6 (Utah App. 1993); International
Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515, 517 (1979)(issue preclusion operates only to issues
which were actually asserted and tried in the prior case). The issues actually litigated in the
first suit must have been essential to the resolution of that action. Robertson v. Campbell 674
P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983). That is not the case here.
The Bankruptcy Court did not resolve the broad issue of ownership of Haste, Inc.
subsequent to Kallinikos' bankruptcy—much less the narrower issue of Gounaris' ownership
interest in Haste, Inc. In fact, it was completely unnecessary for the Bankruptcy Court to
examine the Haste, Inc. ownership question at all in order for the Court to reach the
conclusion that the assignment of Kallinikos1 interest in the Nuttall Personal Note and the
Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note constituted preferential transfers. Quite simply, the ownership of
Haste, Inc. was not "essential to the resolution" of the adversary proceeding. Robertson, 674
P.2d at 1230.
The Bankruptcy Court didhold'that the assignment of Kallinikos interest in the Nuttall
Personal Note and the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note to Gounaris were preferential transfers
16

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547. Under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, a transfer is
avoidable if it: (1) is of an interest of the debtor in property; (2) is for the benefit of a
creditor; (3) is made for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the
transfer was made; (4) is made while the debtor is insolvent; (5) is made on or within ninety
days before the date the bankruptcy petition was filed; and (6) allows the creditor to receive
more than the creditor would otherwise be entitled to receive from the bankruptcy estate. See
In re Qgden. 314 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002)(citing 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b)). The
Bankruptcy Court Order addressed each of these elements. Bankr. Ct. Conclusions of Law
at 10-15 (R. 460-55)(Addendum Exh. 4). The judgment goes no further. In fact, the
Bankruptcy Court even refused to determine whether the transfers in question were avoidable
under other sections of the Bankruptcy Code or whether the transfers violated the Utah
Fraudulent Transfer Act. W. at 15 (R. 455).
Plainly, the issue of Gounaris' ownership interest in Haste, Inc. was not an issue
"actually litigated'1 in the Bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, on its face, the Bankruptcy Court's
Order demonstrates that the ownership issue was not "completely, fully and fairly" litigated
in the Bankruptcy Court.
EL TO THE EXTENT THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF HASTE, INC., THE COURT CONCLUDED GOUNARIS WAS AN
OWNER
The Bankruptcy Court's findings and conclusions preclude the application of res
judicata because to the extent the court addressed the issue of ownership of Haste, Inc., the
Court concluded that Gounaris was an owner of the company.
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The Bankruptcy Court's factual findings state: "The Defendant [Gounaris] was a 50%
stockholder, officer and director of Haste, Inc." Bankr. Ct. Findings of Fact p at 2 (R.
468)(Addendum Exh. 4). And the Court further finds that "[Kallinikos and Gounaris] each
owned a 50% interest in the Haste, Inc. Note." Id. f8 at 2 (R. 468). The Court concludes that
Kallinikos only "had a one-half interest in the [Nuttal Haste, Inc.] note". Bankr. Ct.
Conclusions of Law at 11 (R. 459)(Addendum Exh. 4). These findings are inconsistent with
a finding that Kallinikos owned 100% of Haste, Inc., and that all of Haste, Inc. hence became
part of Kallinikos' bankruptcy estate. The Court acknowledged that the note was "payable to
Haste, Inc." Id. 1f$ at 2 (R. 468). If Kallinikos had owned all of Haste, Inc., then he also
would have owned 100% of the note. But the Bankruptcy Court held instead that Gounaris
owned half of the note. Since the note was the only asset Haste Inc. retained, Gounaris
therefore had an ownership interest in Haste, Inc.
In addition, one of the conclusions reached by the Bankruptcy Court was that
Gounaris was an insider of the Debtor Kallinikos. Bankr. Ct. Conclusions of Law at 13 (R.
457)(Addendum Exh. 4). To make that finding, the Court stated that "[s]ince Defendant
[Gounaris] ... directly owned 20 percent of Haste, Inc. which was an insider of the Debtor
[Kallinikos], the Defendant [Gounaris] was also an insider." Id. The Court further noted:
"even in spite of the Debtor's schedules that indicate at the time of filing he still owned 50%
of Haste, Inc., were the court to conclude that Defendant [Gounaris] did not maintain an
ownership interest in Haste, Inc., as of the date of the Transfer, the Defendant is still an
insider." Id. The Court merely posed a hypothetical, however, and never squarely addressed
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that issue.
Quite the contrary, the Bankruptcy Court's ultimate ruling on the issue of preferential
transfer demonstrates that the Court concluded that Gounaris indeed owned 50% of Haste,
Inc. The Court's order requires only that the 50% portion of the Nuttall Personal Note and
the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note become part of the bankruptcy estate. If, as Zufelt claimed, the
Bankruptcy Court had found Kallinikos owned 100% of Haste, Inc., then correspondingly,
Kallinikos would have owned 100% of the Nuttall Haste, Inc. Note, not the 50% the Court
dictated was part of the bankruptcy estate. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court's final order directly
contradicts Zufelt's claim that the Bankruptcy Court held Kallinikos owned 100% of Haste,
Inc.
The plain language of the Bankruptcy Court's Order and the conclusions it reached
clearly demonstrate that the Bankruptcy Court did not determine that Gounaris had no
ownership interest in Haste, Inc. As a result, the District Court below improperly applied the
doctrine of res judicata to preclude Gounaris from asserting defenses on behalf of Haste, Inc.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the final judgment by the trial court and remand the case
for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of April, 2005.

INEZ
M™^MARTTNE|
y
attorney for Appellants
(j
Haste, Inc. and Harry Gounaris
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit 1:

Trial Court Ruling, dated October 28, 2004 (R. 932-925).

Exhibit 2:

Affidavit of Steven Kallinikos (R. 355-56).

Exhibit 3:

Affidavit of Harry Gounaris (R. 347-48).

Exhibit 4:

Bankruptcy Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 469454).

Exhibit 5:

Bankruptcy Court Judgment (R. 453-451).
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EXHIBIT 1

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

7/^7/oq Jm

-Deputy

IN THE F O U R T H JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
UTAH COUNTY, S T A T E OF UTAH
JIMMY ZUFELT, an individual,

RULING RE: PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE OR DISMISS,
OR ENTER JUDGMENT FOR LACK
OF STANDING

Plaintiff,
vs.
HASTE, INC.; a Utah corporation; and
HARRY GOUNARIS, an individual,

Case # 000403084
Judge Fred D. Howard
Division 5

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike or Dismiss, or
Enter Judgment for Lack of Standing. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby issues the following:

FACTUAL SETTING
Haste Inc. (Haste) was incorporated in Utah in 1990 as a subchapter S corporation with
Harry Gounaris and Steve Kallinikos as equal shareholders, holding and owning 500 shares each
of the common stock of the corporation.
In November of 1997, Haste sold a restaurant known as Burger Supreme to Richard
and Connie Nuttall (Nuttals). The Nuttals gave two notes as consideration for the restaurant.
The larger note in the original amount of $72,000 was made payable to Haste. The smaller note
in the original amount of $15,000 was made payable to Gournaris and Kallinikos.

In 1998, Kallinikos and or Haste entered into a lease with Plaintiff for acquisition of
the premises of a new restaurant business. Kallinikos abandoned the premises of the lease in
April 1999. The obligation that remained owing to Plaintiff was converted into a note in October
1999 for $28,000 owed by Kallinikos.
From November 1, 1997, through early 1999, the distribution of payments on the Notes
was 50-50 between Kallinikos and Gournaris. From the latter part of 1999 through February
2000, more of the payments were distributed to Kallinikos than Gournaris. Kallinikos
experienced financial difficulty and stopped remitting Gournaris' portion of the Notes' proceeds
to him and instead kept the bulk of the proceeds from both Notes for himself By affidavit,
Gournaris and Kallinikos stated that in May and June 1999, Gournaris loaned Kallinikos
$20,000, and that Kallinikos owed Gournaris proceeds from the Larger Note and the Smaller
Note that Kallinikos had neglected to forward to Gournaris.
On or about November 27, 2000, Gournaris corresponded with the Nuttalls and
represented to them that he had purchased the Notes as of February 25, 2000, for the sum of
$12,000 and $3,000, and directed Nuttall to pay all future amounts owing to Gournaris. The
assignment of the Notes by Haste and Kallinikos to Gournaris rendered Haste and Kallinikos
insolvent or they became insolvent as a result of the assignment. Kallinikos filed a voluntary
Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy on February 13, 2001.
Before the Bankruptcy Court, both Gournaris and Kallinikos testified that the $20,000
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transfer was not a loan, but instead represented payment on the sale of Kaiiinikos' interests in the
Notes to Gournaris. The Bankruptcy Court found that the testimony given by Kaiiinikos and
Gournaris lacked credibility and further found that the $20,000 transfer constituted a loan. The
only way Kaiiinikos could repay the loan was through assignment of his interest in the two Notes
to Gournaris. Kaiiinikos transferred his interest in the Notes to Gournaris by assignment
sometime after February 24, 2000. The Bankruptcy Court found that Kaiiinikos' transfer of his
interest in the Notes to Gournaris made him and Haste insolvent, and that the transfer was based
on antecedent debt which occurred within a year of the date of the chapter 7 filing and the Court
avoided the transfer.
Gournaris testified at the Bankruptcy Trial that after the sale of Burger Supreme, he no
longer participated in Haste. Kaiiinikos' Statement of Affairs indicate that he held a 50% interest
in Haste at the time of bankruptcy.

RULING
The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike or Dismiss, or Enter Judgment
For Lack of Standing on June 1, 2004. Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition on June
20, 2004. Plaintiff contends that Stephen Rupp ("Trustee"), Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of
Steven Kaiiinikos, is 100% owner of all stock in Haste and as such, Gournaris ("Defendant")
lacks standing to act on behalf of Haste. Plaintiff asserts that the issue of ownership was
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previously litigated in Bankruptcy Court and collateral estoppel precludes Defendant from relitigating the issue of ownership in Haste before this Court. Defendant contends that he is and
always has been 50% owner of Haste and as such, he is entitled to a portion of Haste's assets and
has standing to assert Haste's interests.
"The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of preventing previously
litigated issues from being relitigated." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, f 57, 44 P.3d
63 (quotations and citations omitted). This doctrine embodies two separate theories, "claim
preclusion and issue preclusion." Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995).
Under either of these branches, "[t]he burden of establishing the elements of res judicata is upon"
Plaintiff. PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Investment Partners, Ltd., 2000 UT App 20, ^ 5, 995 P.2d
1252. To prevent relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action:
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue
in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8,1f 23, 70 P.3d 1 (citation omitted).
Whether or not collateral estoppel bars Defendant's claims is a question of law.
Grynberg, 2003 UT 8 at % 23. First, it is clear that Defendant was both a party and privy to the
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action in the Bankruptcy Court. Steve Kallinikos was the debtor in the Bankruptcy Court action
and Defendant Gournaris was the defendant.
Second, while the ultimate issue before the Bankruptcy Court was whether Kallinikos'
transfer of his interest in the Notes to Defendant constituted a loan or payment, or whether the
transfer was fraudulent, the Bankruptcy Court also heard evidence and made findings regarding
Defendant's ownership interest in Haste. The ultimate issue before this Court is Defendant's
ownership interest in Haste.
Third, Defendant had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue regarding his
ownership interest in Haste. Defendant testified before the Bankruptcy Court that he
"relinquished his ownership interest in Haste" and that "he no longer participated in" Haste after
the sale of Burger Supreme. Defendant also provided the Bankruptcy Court with tax returns
showing that he had relinquished his ownership interest in Haste. The Bankruptcy Court found
that Defendant relinquished his ownership interest in Haste, and noted that Defendant failed to
offer any documentation indicating when or how this was accomplished.
And fourth, the case before the Bankruptcy Court resulted in a final judgment on the
merits wherein the Bankruptcy Court avoided Kallinikos' transfer to Defendant.
The Court notes that while the Bankruptcy Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law may not address the precise issue with perfect clarity, the Court finds that reasonable
conclusions can be drawn from the testimony and evidence presented before the Bankruptcy
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Court which support a finding that issue preclusion is applicable. Specifically, Defendant was
given the oppurtunity to prove his ownership interest in Haste during the Bankruptcy Court
proceedings. In an effort to show the Bankruptcy Court that Defendant no longer retained an
ownership interest in Haste, Defendant presented tax returns that show he had relinquished any
ownership interest in Haste by 1998. Further, in paragraph 23 of its Findings of Fact, the
Bankruptcy Court found, "[Kallinikos] testified that after the sale of Burger Supreme, he
continued doing business through the Haste, Inc. entity. However, the Defendant [Gournaris]
testified he no longer participated in the entity."
The Court finds that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow Defendant to assert
his non-ownership position before the Bankruptcy Court, and then before this Court, switch his
position and assert he has always retained a 50% ownership interest in Haste. The Court notes
the findings of the Bankruptcy Court which concluded that Defendant's testimony was self
serving and lacked credibility. For example, in paragraph 10, the Bankruptcy Court found,
"[Kallinikos] and Defendant have given inconsistent and conflicting testimony regarding a
transfer of [Kallinikos'] interest in the two Notes." In its Conclusions of Law, the Bankruptcy
Court rejected Defendant's "self serving and unexplained about face" regarding his affidavit
averments concerning the transfer of the Notes, and also his conflicting testimony at trial "to
better accommodate the Defendant's defense in this proceeding." In the Findings, paragraph 15,
the Bankruptcy Court further remarks on Defendant's credibility, calling his relationship with
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Kallinikos and Haste a "convoluted and perhaps tax driven manner."
The Court observes that these findings and conclusions suggest that Defendant and
Kallinikos used Haste for their own improper purposes indicating less than straightforward legal
pursuits. Such behavior does not support the objective of the Court to seek and satisfy the
interests of justice.
In conclusion, the Court is persuaded that Defendant has no ownership interest in
Haste, and therefore, Defendant lacks standing to act on behalf of Haste in this matter.
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs motion to strike Defendant's pleadings. The Court
further will consider anew Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Given the Bankruptcy
Court's findings, the Court finds there are no genuine issues of material fact which are in dispute.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Counsel for
Plaintiff is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.

Dated this ^rftttey

of

September, 2004.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the
September, 2004 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit:

2

-~7 day of

by U.S. first class mail
Attorney for Plaintiff:
Steven F. Allred
Troom Park, 584 S. State Strret
Orem, UT 84058
Attorneys for Defendant:
Nick Colesides
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Stephen W. Rupp
McKay Burton & Thurman
Suite 600, Gateway Tower East
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84133

4jjtfL
Deputy Court Clerk
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EXHIBIT 2

NICK J COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, # 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: (801) 521-4441
Attorney for defendants
Haste, Inc., and Harry Gounaris

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JIMMY ZUFELT,
an individual,
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE KALLINIKOS
Plaintiff,
v.
HASTE, INC., a Utah
corporation, and
HARRY GOUNARIS
Defendant,

Case No.: 00 04 03084
Judge: Taylor

I, Steven Kallinikos, being duly sworn, hereby states as
follows:
1.
herein.

I am competent to testify as to the matters set forth
That the facts stated hereinbelow are based upon my own

personal knowledge, and that the said facts are admissible in
evidence in these proceedings.
2.

On or about July 6, 1990, I incorporated Haste, Inc.

with Harry Gounaris for the purpose of doing business as a

-*0n

restaurant named Burger Supreme located at 1796 North University
Parkway, Provo, Utah.
3.

Harry Gounaris at all times relevant herein was and

still is a resident of the State of Illinois.
4.

I operated Burger Supreme and Gounaris supplied the

capital investment necessary to fund the operations of the
restaurant.
5.

Throughout Haste, Inc.'s existence, Gounaris loaned

substantial sums to the company in order to sustain operations.
6.

On or about November 1997, Haste, Inc. sold all its

assets, including Burger Supreme, to Richard Nuttall in exchange
for two notes dated November 1, 1997.

The first note in the

amount of $15,000 was made to Gounaris and to me personally
{"Personal Note").
Personal Note.

Gounaris and I each had a 50% interest in the

The second note in the amount of $72,000 was made

to Haste, Inc. ("Haste, Inc. Note"). Gounaris and I also each
owned a 50% interest in the Haste, Inc. Note.
7.

Haste, Inc. no longer conducted any business after the

sale of all its assets to Nuttall.
8.

After the sale of the Haste, Inc. assets to Richard

Nuttall, Haste, Inc.'s only purpose was to act as recipient of
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Q r] -

the amounts due under the Haste, Inc. Note and distribute those
funds to Gounaris and me.
9.

Haste, Inc. continued to received the payments under the

Haste, Inc. Note, which were distributed for a time half to
Gounaris and half to me.

However, at some point in 1999, I

experienced financial difficulty and stopped remitting Gounaris'
portion of the Note proceeds to him. Instead I kept the bulk of
the proceeds from both the Personal and Haste, Inc. Notes for
myself.
10.

Unbeknownst to Gounaris, in March 1998, I executed a

Lease Agreement with Jimmy Zufelt. I personally guaranteed the
Lease Agreement. At the time I executed the Lease Agreement, I
intended to start a new restaurant business in the leased
premises.

That new business venture provided no benefit to

Gounaris or to Haste, Inc. and was entirely my own personal
venture.
11.

Although, the Lease Agreement indicates that Haste,

Inc. entered into the lease, I entered the lease personally
without informing Gounaris and without authority from Haste,
Inc. .
12.

In April, 1999, I abandoned the leased premises.
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13.

In May and June 1999, Gounaris loaned me $20,000.

In

addition to the $20,000 loan, I owed Gounaris proceeds from the
Haste, Inc. Note and the Personal Note that I had neglected to
forward to Gounaris.
14.

Zufelt knew that I alone stood behind the Lease

Agreement because I explained exactly that to Zufelt. I never
told Zufelt that Haste, Inc. assets were available to satisfy my
personal obligation pursuant to the Lease Agreement.

As a result

in October 1999, Zufelt and I negotiated a compromise of the
amounts due and owing under the Lease Agreement at the time I
abandoned the premises.

Because Zufelt knew that I alone was

obligated under the Lease Agreement Zufelt did not look to Haste,
Inc. to satisfy the amounts due and owing pursuant to that
agreement.
15.

In order to compromise the amount I owed to Zufelt, I

personally executed a Promissory Note in favor of Zufelt. Both
Zufelt and I understood that the Promissory Note only obligated
me, not Haste, Inc..

By that Promissory Note Zufelt and I

intended to resolve all obligations pursuant to the Lease
Agreement.
16.

On or about February, 2000, Gounaris demanded that I
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repay the $20,000 he had loaned to me and account for money I
received from the Personal Note and the Haste, Inc. Note.
17.

I was unable to repay Gounaris except through an

assignment of his interest in the Personal Note and the Haste,
Inc. Note.

Thus, on February 25, 200 0, I assigned my right in

the Personal Note and Haste, Inc.'s rights in the Haste, Inc.
Note to Gounaris.
18.

By the transfer to Gounaris, I did not intend to

defraud any of my creditors.

Rather the transfer to Gounaris was

intended to satisfy an obligation tp Gounaris stemming from the
1997 sale of Haste, Inc.'s business to Nuttall and to repay loans
he made to me.
19.

After the February 25, 2000 assignment to Gounaris of

the Personal Note and the Haste, Inc. Note, I forwarded all
payments I received pursuant to those notes directly to Gounaris.
I did not retain control over those funds after the transfer was
effectuated.
20.

I received reasonably equivalent value in return for

the assignment of my interest in the Personal Note and the Haste,
Inc. Note to Gounaris.

Gounaris already owned a 50% interest in

both the Haste, Inc. Note and the Personal Note stemming from the
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sale of Burger Supreme to Muttall.

Thus, I assigned only my 50%

interest in the notes to Gounaris.

At the time of the

assignment, Gounaris had recently loaned me $20,000 drawn from
Gounaris' home equity line of credit.

I had also borrowed

portions of the note proceeds belonging to Gounaris.

Gounaris

canceled those borrowed amounts in exchange for the assignment.
Thus, Gounaris paid approximately $25,000 for the assignment from
me of the Personal Note and the Haste, Inc. Note.
21.

At the time of the assignment of the Haste, Inc. Note,

Gounaris had no reason to believe that I was insolvent and in
fact at the time of the assignment to Gounaris I was not
insolvent.
Dated this ]X ( day of January, 200JL.
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STATE OF

i *-. ^ I Q <o /-IT

)
SS

COUNTY O F

<v. o 3 k

On the Z» V" th day of January, 2002, personally appeared
before me Steve Kallinikos, who being by me duly sworn, did say,
that he is the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires

K

*-$L
N O T A R Y PUBLIC, Residing in

State of

J d_ /uo

OFFICIAL SEAL
FRANK R WIEMERSLAGE:
NOTARY PUWUC, STATE OF ILLINOIS J
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:07/27/02

7

fjr

~?

iU>|.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Filed the original of the foregoing to:
DISTRICT COURT CLERK
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
12 5 NORTH 10 0 WEST
PROVO UT 84601-2849
and served a copy thereof to the attorney for plaintiff addressed
as follows:
MR STEVEN F ALLRED ESQ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
TROON PARK
5 84 SOUTH STATE
OREM UTAH 84 058

fl

via hand delivery
via fax: 801.225-3658
via first class mail, postage prepaid

this (/%

day of January, 2002.

C \WPDOCS\G\gounaris v zufelt litig 20 wpd
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EXHIBIT 3

NICK J COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, # 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: (801) 521-4441
Attorney for defendants
Haste, Inc., and Harry Gounaris

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JIMMY ZUFELT,
an individual,
AFFIDAVIT OF HARRY GOUNARIS
Plaintiff,
v.
HASTE, INC., a Utah
corporation, and
HARRY GOUNARIS
Defendant,

Case No.: 00 04 03084
Judge: Taylor

I, Harry Gounaris, being duly sworn, hereby state as
follows:
1.
herein.

I am competent to testify as to the matters set forth
That the facts stated hereinbelow are based upon my own

personal knowledge, and that the said facts are admissible in
evidence in these proceedings.
2.

On or about July 6, 1990, Steve Kallinikos and I

incorporated Haste, Inc. for the purpose of doing business as a

restaurant named Burger Supreme located at 1796 North University
Parkway, Provo, Utah.
3.

Kallinikos operated Burger Supreme and I supplied the

capital investment necessary to fund the operations of the
restaurant.
4.

Throughout Haste, Inc.'s existence, I loaned substantial

sums to the company in order to sustain operations.
5.

On or about November 1997, Haste, Inc. sold all its

assets, including Burger Supreme, to Richard Nuttall in exchange
for two notes dated November 1, 1997.

The first note in the

amount of $15,000 was made to me and Kallinikos personally
(''Personal Note'') .

Kallinikos and I each had a 50% interest in

the Personal Note.

The second note in the amount of $72,000 was

made to Haste, Inc. ("Haste, Inc. Note").

Kallinikos and I

likewise had a 50% interest in the Haste, Inc. Note.
6.

Haste, Inc. no longer conducted any business after the

sale of all its assets to Nuttall.
7.

After the sale of the Haste, Inc. assets to Richard

Nuttall, Haste, Inc.'s only purpose was to act as recipient of
the amounts due under the Haste, Inc. Note and distribute those
funds to me and Kallinikos.
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8.

Haste, Inc. continued to receive the payments under the

Haste, Inc. Note, which were distributed for a time half to me
and half to Kallinikos.

However, at some point in 1999,

Kallinikos experienced financial difficulty and stopped remitting
my portion of the Note proceeds to me.
9.

Unbeknownst to me and without my authority, in March

1998, Kallinikos executed a Lease Agreement with Jimmy Zufelt.
Kallinikos intended to start a new restaurant business in the
leased premises.

That new business venture provided no benefit

to me or to Haste, Inc..
10.

Although the Lease Agreement between Zufelt and

Kallinikos indicates that Haste, Inc. entered into the lease,
Kallinikos entered the lease personally without informing me and
without authority from Haste, Inc..
11.

In May and June 1999, I loaned Kallinikos $20,000.

In

addition to the $20,000 loan, Kallinikos owed me proceeds from
the Haste, Inc. Note and the Personal Note that he had neglected
to forward to me.
12.

Zufelt did not look to Haste, Inc. to satisfy the

amounts due and owing pursuant to the Lease Agreement Kallinikos
entered into with Zufelt.
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13.

On or about February, 2000, I demanded that Kallinikos

repay the $20,000 I had loaned to him and account for money
received on the Personal Note and the Haste, Inc. Note that
should have come to me but was instead kept by Kallinikos.
14.

Kallinikos was unable to repay me except through an

assignment of his interest in the Personal Note and the Haste,
Inc. Note.

Thus, on February 25, 2 0 00, Kallinikos assigned his

rights in both the Personal Note and the Haste, Inc. Note to me.
15.

The assignment of the Notes to me was intended to

satisfy Haste, Inc.'s obligation to me stemming from the 1997
sale of Haste, Inc.'s business to Nuttall and to repay loans made
by me to Kallinikos.
16.

After the February 25, 2000 assignment to me of the

Personal Note and the Haste, Inc. Note, Kallinikos forwarded all
payments he received pursuant to those notes directly to me.
Kallinikos and Haste, Inc. did not retain control over those
funds after the transfer was effectuated.
17.

Kallinikos received reasonably equivalent value in

return for the assignment of his interest in the Personal Note
and the Haste, Inc. Note.

I already owned a 50% interest in both

the Haste, Inc. Note and the Personal Note stemming from the sale
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of Burger Supreme to Nuttall.

Thus, Kallinikos assigned only his

50% interest in the notes to me.
18.

At the time of the assignment, I had recently loaned

Kallinikos $20,000 drawn from my home equity line of credit.
Kallinikos had also borrowed portions of the note proceeds
belonging to me.
assignment.

I forgave those debts in exchange for the

Thus, I paid approximately $25,000 for the

assignment of the Personal Note and the Haste, Inc. Note.
19.

At the time of the assignment of the Haste, Inc. Note,

I had no reason to believe that Kallinikos was insolvent.
TM
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On the '^-^f th day of January, 2002, personally appeared
before me Harry Gounaris, who being by me duly sworn, did say,
that he is the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in
State of

/

OFFICIAL SEAL
FRANK R WIEMERSLAGE;
NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF ILLINOIS \
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:07/27/02

' fJ Q> L-S"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Filed the original of the foregoing to:
DISTRICT COURT CLERK
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
12 5 NORTH 10 0 WEST
PROVO UT 84601-2849
and served a copy thereof to the attorney for plaintiff addressed
as follows:
MR STEVEN F ALLRED ESQ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
TROON PARK
584 SOUTH STATE
OREM UTAH 84 058
via hand delivery
via fax: 801.225-3658
via first class mail, postage prepaid
4
this Tg ^day of January, 2002.
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

'OH

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
Bankruptcy Number 01-21857

In re:
STEVE KALLINIKOS and DEBBIE
KALLINIKOS

Chapter 7

Debtors.
STEPHEN W. RUPP, Chapter 7 Trustee,

Adversary Proceeding Number 01-2192

Plaintiff,
v.
HARRY GOUNARIS,
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter is under advisement after trial of the Chapter 7 Trustee's (Trustee) complaint
seeking avoidance of a transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 5471 and U.C.A. § 25-6-6(2), and 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1)(b) and U.C.A. §§ 25-6-5(l)(b) and 25-6-6(1). The Trustee's complaint alleges that
Steve Kallinikos, the debtor herein (Debtor), assigned a 50% interest in two promissory notes to
Harry Gounaris (Defendant), and that the assignment was avoidable as a preferential transfer
pursuant to § 547 of the Code or, alternatively, that the assignment was an avoidable fraudulent

i

Future references are to title 11 on the United States Code, unless otherwise noted.

transfer under § 548 of the Code, and §§ 25-6-5 and 25-6-6(2) of Utah's Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act. The court has now heard the evidence and arguments of counsel, and has made an
independent review of applicable case law. The court has also judged the credibility of the
witnesses, and has concluded, as set forth below, that portions of the testimony of both the
Debtor and the Defendant lack credibility. Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052, the court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition on February 13,2001.

2.

The Debtor was a principal, 50% stockholder and officer of Haste, Inc.

3.

The Defendant was a 50% stockholder, officer and director of Haste, Inc.

4.

Haste, Inc., was a subchapter S Corporation.

5.

The Debtor and Defendant had been friends prior to their entering into the Haste,
Inc. business venture, and have continued that relationship.

6.

The Defendant lives in Des Plaines, Illinois. The Debtor has moved from Utah to
Des Plaines, Illinois.

7.

Haste, Inc. sold a restaurant known as Burger Supreme to Richard and Connie
Nuttall (Nuttals) in November 1997.

8.

In consideration for the sale, the Nuttalls paid a portion of the purchase price in
cash at the time of sale, and also executed two notes. The Nuttals executed a note
payable to Haste, Inc., in the amount of $72,000 to be paid by 118 monthly
payments with interest at the rate of 9%. The Debtor and Defendant each owned a
50% interest in the Haste, Inc. Note. The Nuttalls also executed a note to the
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Debtor and the Defendant in the amount of $15,000 to be paid by 123 monthly
payments with interest at the rate of 9%. The notes are secured by the restaurant
property. (Hereafter "the Notes".)
9.

From November 1, 1997, through early 1999, the distribution of payments on the
notes was 50-50 between Defendant and Debtor. From the latter part of 1999
through February 2000, more of the payments were distributed to the Debtor than
the Defendant. The Debtor experienced financial difficulty and stopped remitting
the Defendant's portion of the Notes' proceeds to him and instead kept the bulk of
the proceeds from both Notes for himself.

10.

The Debtor and Defendant have given inconsistent and conflicting testimony
regarding a transfer of the Debtor's interest in the two Notes.

11.

By affidavits filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County,
State of Utah in the case of Jimmy Zufelt v. Haste, Inc. and Harry Gounaris, case
no. 00-04-0384, both Defendant and Debtor stated that in May and June 1999,
Defendant loaned the Debtor $20,000, and that the Debtor owed the Defendant
proceeds from the Haste, Inc. note and the personal note that the Debtor had
neglected to forward to the Defendant.

12.

The affidavits also state that in February 2000, the Defendant demanded that the
Debtor repay the $20,000 loan and account for money the Debtor had received
from the Notes.

13.

The Debtor and Defendant testified in this trial that, directly contrary to their
statements in the affidavits, the transfer of the $20,000 from the Defendant to the
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Debtor was not a loan, but instead represented payment on the sale of the Debtor's
interests in the Notes to the Defendant.
14.

Rather than the $20,000 set forth in the affidavits, the Defendant testified that he
transferred to the Debtor $10,000 and $5,000 in cash, and also credited a $2,000
debt the Debtor owed to him, as well as 6 payments on the Notes that the Debtor
appropriated for himself, for a total payment by the Defendant to the Debtor of
$23,000. The Defendant testified that the method he used to transfer the cash
funds to the Debtor was for the Defendant to write home equity loan checks, not
to the Debtor but instead to his own company. The Defendant's company then
allegedly changed the funds into cash which was given to the Debtor.

15.

Judging the credibility of the statements of the Defendant and the Debtor, the
court finds that the payment of funds from the Defendant to the Debtor, in
whatever convoluted and perhaps tax driven manner, constituted a loan from the
Defendant to the Debtor.

16.

Upon Defendants subsequent demand for repayment of the loan, the only way the
Debtor was able to repay the Defendant was through assignment of the Debtor's
interest in the two Notes.

17.

The Debtor transferred his interest in the Notes to the Defendant by assignment
sometime after February 24, 2000 (Transfer).

18.

A statement dated February 25, 2000, typed at the bottom of each note indicates
that each note was assigned by the Debtor to the Defendant.

19.

The Defendant has admitted the following:
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a.

The actual date of the assignments of the Notes was February 25, 2000.

b.

The amount of the consideration for the assignments was determined by
negotiation based upon monies delivered to the Debtor in May and June
1999.

20.

Exhibit "D"dated November 27, 2000, is the only written notice of any
assignment of the Notes given to Richard Nuttall.

21.

Exhibit "D" evidences that the Notes were transferred directly from Debtor to
Defendant.

22.

As of February 12, 2001, the principle balance due on the Haste, Inc. note was
$54,749.52, and on the $15,000 note was $11,724.54. Half of the balances of the
two notes as of February 12, 2001, was $33,207.03.

23.

The Debtor testified that after the sale of Burger Supreme, he continued doing
business through the Haste, Inc. entity. However, the Defendant testified he no
longer participated in the entity. No documentation has been offered to indicate
when or how the Defendant relinquished his ownership interest in Haste, Inc.

24.

The Debtor's Statement of Affairs, Paragraph 16, indicate that the Debtor had
only a 50% interest in Haste, Inc., operated as Golden Burger and Teriyaki
Express, and listed as currently in good standing but not operating as of the date
of the filing of the Chapter 7 petition.

25.

In 1998 the Debtor and or Haste, Inc. entered into a lease with Jimmy Zufelt for
acquisition of the premises of a new restaurant business, which the Debtor called
Nikos Teriyaki Express. The Debtor abandoned the premises of the lease in April
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1999. The obligation that remained owing to Zufelt was converted into a note in
October 1999, for $28,000 owed by the Debtor. The Debtor's Chapter 7
schedules list the obligation owed by the Debtor to Zufelt as a noncontingent,
liquidated and undisputed claim for $32,875.
26.

The Debtor filed a federal income tax return for 1998 for Haste, Inc., dba Nikos
Teriyaki Express with a business address of Des Plaines, D.

27.

In 1999, the Debtor entered into a 10 to 15 year lease with Courtyard at
Jamestown Associates for the premises upon which he operated a new restaurant
business. This business was operated by Haste, Inc., dba the Golden Burger.

28.

The Debtor utilized the cash proceeds from the sale of Burger Supreme to
purchase equipment for Golden Burger. The Debtor pledged all the equipment to
Courtyard at Jamestown Associates to secure the lease. The Golden Burger
business was operated for approximately 8 months. The business suffered
significant losses. The Debtor surrendered the leased premises and the equipment
to Courtyard at Jamestown Associates, and the equipment was sold at sheriffs'
sale.

29.

Courtyard at Jamestown Associates is listed as a creditor in the Debtor's Chapter
7 schedules with an uncontingent, liquidated and undisputed claim of $50,000.

30.

For 14 months prior to filing the Chapter 7 petition the Debtor was not paying his
obligations related to Golden Burger and Teriyaki Express to the State Tax
Commission as they became due.
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31.

A statement of assets, liabilities and stockholder's equity for Haste, Inc., dated
December 31, 1999, reflects total assets of $103,068.51 and liabilities of
$7,880.85. The document does not reflect a debt, secured or otherwise, to
Courtyard at Jamestown Associates.

32.

The 1999 Haste, Inc. Federal income tax return reflects a $50,479 loss. It also
reflects total assets of $103,069.

33.

The $103,069 listed as assets on the 1999 Haste, Inc. Federal income tax return
does not reflect the equity that existed in Haste, Inc., assets at that time.

34.

No place on Schedule "L" of the tax returns for Haste, Inc. for the years, 1998,
1999, or 2000 is there any scheduling of the Haste, Inc. Note.

35.

A statement of assets, liabilities and stockholder's equity for Haste, Inc., dated
July 31, 2000, reflects total assets of $67,781.25 and liabilities of $24,523.37.
The document does not reflect a debt, secured or otherwise, to Courtyard at
Jamestown Associates.

36.

The Debtor ceased operating Golden Burger in May of 2000.

37.

The statement of revenues and expenses dated July 31,2000, reflects a year to
date net loss of $48,258.78.

38.

Haste, Inc.'s accountant testified that if all of Haste, Inc.'s, assets were pledged to
a creditor with a debt that exceeded the value of assets, there would be no equity
in the business.

39.

The court finds that, as of the date of the Transfer, no equity existed in Haste, Inc.
for either the Debtor or the Defendant.
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40.

Debtor's amended schedules list $146,235.87 in unsecured nonpriority claims.

41.

The Debtor's schedules list $12,000 in priority tax claims and $14,000 in secured
claims.

42.

The Debtor incurred the following debt on the designated dates:
a.

Standard Restaurant, $7,165.52 on June 15, 1999.

b.

Canyon View Medical and Utah Valley Radiology, $1,004.53 in 1997,
1999, and after the subject Transfer, in May 2000.

43.

c.

RSI Restaurant Specialist, $3,018.48 on February 26,1999.

d.

ARC, $847.35 during January 20,1999, through December 11, 1999.

e.

IHC, $1,621.85 on May 13,1999.

f.

Jimmy Zufelt, $28,800 on October 19,1999.

The Debtor owed in excess of $41,000 prior to the Transfer, not including any
personal liability for unpaid corporate sales taxes or the liability to Canyon View
Medical and Utah Valley Radiology.

44.

The Debtor's schedules list $36,445 in joint assets, including an overencumbered
1996 V-6 Audi Quattro Wagon titled in the name of Haste, Inc., with a loan in
Debbie Kallinikos' name, and a leased 1996 Dodge Dakota.

45.

The Debtor's schedule B, Personal Property, does not list any cash on hand or in
accounts.

46.

The Debtor's Statement of Affairs, Paragraph 11 lists a closed financial account at
Key Bank.
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47.

The Debtor testified that he had $7,000 to $8,000 in savings from the time he was
operating Burger Supreme until 2001 or 2002. This asset, if it existed, was
undisclosed on the Debtor's schedules, even as amended.

48.

The Debtor testified that he did not know it was necessary to list the $7,000 to
$8,000 in savings on his schedules. This testimony is not credible, and, if the
funds existed on the date of the Transfer, they were concealed from creditors.

49.

The Debtor received a total of approximately $24,000 from the March, 2000, sale
of his Mapleton home owned jointly by he and his wife.

50.

As of the date of the Transfer, the Debtor was entitled to exempt his share of the
equity in his residence.

51.

In response to the Trustee's request for the production of prepared and filed state
and federal income tax returns for the years 1998,1999,2000, the Debtor has
stated:
"The significant business losses, medical problems, extremely low
personal income by both debtors (Mr. and Mrs. Kallinikos) during the
years 1998,1999, and 2000, and the absence of any asset other than the
assigned promissory note cast doubt as to the Trustee's need for these tax
returns to administer the bankruptcy estate."

52.

The Debtor has stated and scheduled under oath that his only income in years
1999 and 2000 were payments received on the Notes. He declared receiving
$7,000.00 per year.

53.

The Debtor's assets at the time of the Transfer, exclusive of his interest in the two
Notes, the concealed cash if it existed, and the exempt equity in his home, were
valued at less than his debt.
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54.

The Debtor was not paying his debts as they became due at the time of the
Transfer.

55.

The Trustee filed the within complaint on June 18, 2001, seeking avoidance of the
Transfer and for a money judgment against the Defendant for $35,000 or an
amount to be proven at trial.

56.

Unsecured claims totaling $63,994.71 have been filed against this estate, which is
insolvent.

57.

For some period of time, payments on the Notes have been tendered to the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah in the case of Jimmy
Zufelt v. Haste, Inc. and Harry Gounaris, case no. 00-04-0384.

From the forgoing Findings of Fact the court makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this complaint. The
matter is Core pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)((F) and (H), and the court may enter a final order.
The Trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of the Transfer under § 547(b), and the
Defendant has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of the transfer under § 547(c).
The court will first consider the Trustee's First Claim for Relief plead under § 547 and
U.C.A. §§ 25-6-6(2) of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The Trustee must prove all
the elements of § 5472 in order to avoid the transfer of the Debtor's interest in the Notes to the

1

11 U.S.C. § 547(b) states:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property ~
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Defendant. The Trustee has proven that the Transfer of the Debtor's interest in the Notes
constituted a transfer of the Debtor's interest in property. Even though one note was payable to
Haste, Inc., the Debtor had a one-half interest in the note, and transferred his interest therein to
the Defendant.
At the time of the Transfer the Defendant was a creditor of the Debtor and the Defendant
therefore held an antecedent debt. The Debtor and Defendant's testimony on whether the funds
transfer from the Defendant to the Debtor was a loan or evidenced the Defendant's purchase of
the Notes directly conflict with their prior affidavits filed in the state court action. Without
explanation, they both now tell a different story to better accommodate the Defendant's defense
in this proceeding. The court rejects this self serving and unexplained about face and determines
that the more credible evidence is that the Defendant made a loan to the Debtor that was unpaid
at the time of the Transfer.
The Transfer occurred at the earliest on February 25, 2000, and was therefore within a
year of the date of the Debtor's chapter 7 filing. Section 547(e)(2)(B) states that a transfer is
made "at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after... 10 days."
Perfection of the promissory notes occurs when "a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a

(1)
to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2)
for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3)
while the debtor was insolvent;
(4)
made(A)
on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B)
between ninety days and one year before the date of thefilingof the petition, if
such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5)
That enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if(A)
the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B)
the transfer had not been made; and
(C)
such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
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judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee." § 547(e)(1)(B). Perfection of the
Transfer of the Notes was accomplished when Defendant took possession of them, on or about
February 25, 2000. Therefore, the transfer took place, as argued by the Trustee, at least within
the one-year preference period which applies to insiders.
The Trustee has carried his burden to prove that the Debtor was insolvent3 at the time of
the Transfer. The evidence indicates that the Debtor owed in excess of $41,000 prior to the
Transfer, not including any personal liability for unpaid corporate sales taxes or the liability to
Canyon View Medical and Utah Valley Radiology. The Debtor's assets, at fair valuation, were
less than his debts. The equity the Debtor may have held in his jointly-owned residence is
excluded from the insolvency analysis. Likewise, the cash of $7,000 to $8,000 the Debtor
testified he maintained, and which was undisclosed on his schedules, is excluded. It is simply
disingenuous for the Debtor to testify he didn't understand he was obligated to disclose this asset
on his schedules, assuming it existed, and the only conclusion the court can draw is that he
concealed the cash with the intent to hinder his creditors. Further, the Debtor cannot rely upon
his interest in the alleged equity in Haste, Inc. to establish his solvency, because the assets of
Haste, Inc. were fully encumbered.

11 U.S.C. § 101(32) "insolvent" means(A)
with reference to an entity other than a partnership and a municipality, financial condition
such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a
fair valuation, exclusive of(i)
property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay or
defraud such entity's creditors; and
(ii)
property that may be exempted from property of the estate under section 522 of
this title
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The court also concludes that the Defendant was an insider of the Debtor for two reasons.
First, the Defendant falls within the statutory definition under §101(31)(A)(iv) which provides
that an insider includes a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in
control, and § 101(31)(E) which provides that an insider is an "affiliate, or insider of an affiliate
as if such affiliate were the debtor. §§ 101(31)(A)(iv) and (E). An affiliate is further defined as
an "entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or
more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor

" § 101(2)(a). Since the Defendant

was an entity that directly owed 20 percent of Haste, Inc., which was an insider of the Debtor, the
Defendant was also an insider. Second, even in spite of the Debtor's schedules that indicate at
the time of filing he still owned only 50% of Haste, Inc., were the court to conclude that the
Defendant did not maintain an ownership interest in Haste, Inc., as of the date of the Transfer, the
Defendant is still an insider. The list in § 101(31)(A) was not meant to be all-inclusive. By
using the non-limiting term "includes," Congress suggested that § 101(31)(A) is not limited to
those specific instances, but was to be "flexibly applied on a case-by-case basis." Wilson v.
Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found, ofAm., Inc.), Ill F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 1983). See,
In re Krehl, 86 F.3d 737, 741 (10th Cir. 1996). Congress further suggested that the term insider
included "one who has a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made
subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arms length with the debtor." H.R. Rep. No. 95595, at 312,1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.. 5963, 6269. "In ascertaining insider status, then, courts have
looked to the closeness of the relationship between the parties and to whether any transaction
between them were conducted at arm's length." In re Krehl, 86 F.3d at 742. Here, the Debtor
and Defendant have a close friendship which began prior to entering into the Haste, Inc. venture
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and continues today, even to the point that the Defendant and Debtor synchronize their testimony
in this proceeding that is inconsistent with their prior testimony.4 This close personal
relationship led to a loan and the assignment of the Notes in payment thereof, that was not done
at arms length. The Defendant availed himself of his relationship with the Debtor to benefit
himself over all other creditors in obtaining full repayment of the debt owed to him. Defendant
was an insider according to how Congress intended insider to be defined under § 547(b).
Finally, this estate is not solvent. Therefore, the Defendant received more in repayment
of his antecedent debt than other creditors. Applying the facts found above to the statutory
requirements necessary to prove a preferential transfer, the court concludes that the Trustee has
met his burden. The Defendant, however, has failed to prove any of the exceptions to avoidance
set forth in § 547(c). As a result, the Trustee is entitled to judgment avoiding the transfer of the
Debtor's interests in the two notes.
The Defendant argues that he is entitled to setoff the debt owed to him that would be
created by the avoidance of the transfer, against any recovery obtained by the estate. This is
incorrect. Section 553 only allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts
against each other. Mutuality requires that the offset be between valid and enforceable
prepetition debts owed by the debtor to the creditor, against valid and enforceable prepetition
claims owed by the debtor to the creditor. Tuttle v. Buckner (In re Buckner), 218 B.R. 137, 145
(10th Cir. BAP 1998). The Defendant cannot offset a postpetition claim against the estate against
because there is no mutuality. Further, § 550 allows property to be recovered for the benefit of

4

See, Pfeiffer v. Thomas (In re Reinbold), 182 B.R. 244, 246 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that
defendant's close personal friendship with debtor deserved greater scrutiny); Koch v. Rogers (In re Broumas), 1998
WL 77842, at *7-8 (4th Cir. 1995) (debtor's and defendant's close friendship warranted careful scrutiny).
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the estate. Research-Planning v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp. j , 917 F.2d
424, 428 (10th Cir. 1990) {en banc) (it is not equitable that one general unsecured creditor of the
estate should be made whole by virtue of the exercise of the trustee's avoidance powers which
others must make do with their share of the bankruptcy estates under section 726). The
Defendant's argument that he is entitled to setoff is rejected.
CONCLUSION
The Trustee is entitled to a judgment avoiding the transfer of the Debtor's interest in the
Notes pursuant to § 547. It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether the Trustee may also
be entitled to avoid the transfer of the Debtor's interest in the Notes pursuant to § 548 or U.C.A.
§ 25-6-5(l)(b) and § 25-6-6-(l) of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The court will
reserve any ruling on a money judgment against the Defendant and in favor of the estate pending
the filing of a complaint pleading § 550 which shall be brought within the time allowed in
§ 550(f), and a determination of any amount actually received by the Defendant that is property
of this estate.
DATED t h i s ^ O day of July, 2002.
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the forgoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to the following, on this
jLfT
day of July, 2002.

Stephen W. Rupp
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Suite 600, Gateway Tower East
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Attorneys for the Trustee

Nick J. Colessides
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3325
Attorney for Defendant

Law Clerk
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EXHIBIT 5

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
Bankruptcy Number 01-21857

In re:
STEVE KALLINIKOS and DEBBIE
KALLINIKOS

Chapter 7

Debtors.
STEPHEN W. RUPP, Chapter 7 Trustee,

Adversary Proceeding Number 01-2192

Plaintiff,
v.
HARRY GOUNARIS,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT
This matter is under advisement after trial of the Chapter 7 Trustee's (Trustee) complaint
seeking avoidance of a transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 5471 and U.C.A. § 25-6-6(2), and 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1)(b) andU.CA. §§ 25-6-5(l)(b) and 25-6-6(1). The Trustee's complaint alleges that
Steve Kallinikos, the debtor herein (Debtor), assigned a 50% interest in two promissory notes to
Harry Gounaris (Defendant), and that the assignment was avoidable as a preferential transfer
pursuant to § 547 of the Code or, alternatively, that the assignment was an avoidable fraudulent

Future references are to title 11 on the United States Code, unless otherwise noted.

transfer under § 548 of the Code, and §§ 25-6-5 and 25-6-6(2) of Utah's Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act. The court has now heard the evidence and arguments of counsel, and has made an
independent review of applicable case law. The court has also judged the credibility of the
witnesses. Accordingly, the court has entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law as of this
date. Based thereon, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the transfer of the Debtor's interest in that certain note dated November
1,1997, in the amount of $72,000, between Connie L. Nuttal and Richard L. Nuttal as Maker and
Haste, Inc., as Payee, to Harry Gounaris, is hereby avoided pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547, and the
Debtor's interest is property of this bankruptcy estate, and it is further
ORDERED, and that the transfer of the Debtor's interest in that certain note dated
November 1,1997, in the amount of $15,000, between Connie L. Nuttal and Richard L. Nuttal as
Maker and Harry Gounaris and Steve Kallinikos as Payee, to Harry Gounaris, is hereby avoided
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547, and the Debtor's interest is property of this bankruptcy estate.
DATED this ^ C d a y of July, 2002.

ijrflfA. BOULDErT~
ited States Bankruptcy Judge

I:\LAW\OPINIONS\Opin0369.wpd

-2-

July 25,2002

ooOOOOoo

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the forgoing Judgment to the
following, on this
oZS"~
day of July, 2002.

Stephen W. Rupp
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Suite 600, Gateway Tower East
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Attorneys for the Trustee

Nick J. Colessides
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3325
Attorney for Defendant

Law Clerk
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Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals:
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and served two copies of the foregoing upon each of the following:
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McKay Burton & Thurman
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